Encryption Standards
Document owner: Chief Information Security Officer (CISO)
Version: 3.0
Effective date: January 1, 2026
Last updated: January 15, 2026
Classification: Public — Trust Center
Review cadence: Annual, and upon NIST/CISA cryptographic guidance updates or material technology changes
Company: Acme Cloud, Inc.
Address: 1200 Market Street, Suite 400, San Francisco, CA 94103, USA
Primary contacts: trust@acmecloud.com | security@acmecloud.com | privacy@acmecloud.com
Definitions
| Term | Definition |
|---|
| AES | Advanced Encryption Standard, symmetric block cipher |
| Asymmetric Encryption | Encryption using public/private key pairs |
| Block Cipher | Encryption algorithm operating on fixed-size data blocks |
| CBC | Cipher Block Chaining, block cipher mode of operation |
| Certificate Authority (CA) | Entity issuing digital certificates |
| CMK | Customer Master Key, top-level key in AWS KMS hierarchy |
| Cryptographic Agility | Ability to switch cryptographic algorithms without major system changes |
| Data Encryption Key (DEK) | Symmetric key encrypting data directly |
| Digital Certificate | Electronic document binding public key to identity |
| ECDSA | Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm |
| Ed25519 | Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm using Curve25519 |
| Envelope Encryption | Pattern using DEK encrypted by KEK |
| FIPS 140-2/3 | Federal Information Processing Standard for cryptographic modules |
| GCM | Galois/Counter Mode, authenticated encryption mode |
| HKDF | HMAC-based Key Derivation Function |
| HMAC | Hash-based Message Authentication Code |
| HSM | Hardware Security Module, physical device for key protection |
| HSTS | HTTP Strict Transport Security |
| KEK | Key Encryption Key, key that encrypts other keys |
| Key Rotation | Process of retiring and replacing cryptographic keys |
| KMS | Key Management Service, system for managing encryption keys |
| mTLS | Mutual TLS, bidirectional certificate authentication |
| NIST | National Institute of Standards and Technology |
| OCSP | Online Certificate Status Protocol |
| Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) | Property ensuring session keys cannot be compromised by long-term key compromise |
| PKI | Public Key Infrastructure, framework for managing digital certificates |
| Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) | Cryptographic algorithms resistant to quantum computer attacks |
| RSA | Rivest-Shamir-Adleman, asymmetric encryption algorithm |
| Salt | Random data added before hashing to prevent rainbow table attacks |
| SHA | Secure Hash Algorithm family |
| Symmetric Encryption | Encryption using same key for encryption and decryption |
| TDE | Transparent Data Encryption, database-level encryption |
| TLS | Transport Layer Security, protocol for encrypted network communication |
| X.509 | Standard for public key certificates |
Scope and Applicability
1.1 Document Scope
This Encryption Standards document defines cryptographic requirements for all Acme Cloud, Inc. ("Acme Cloud") systems processing, storing, or transmitting information. Standards align with:
| Standard/Framework | Alignment |
|---|
| NIST SP 800-57 | Key management recommendations |
| NIST SP 800-131A | Cryptographic algorithm transitions |
| NIST SP 800-175B | Cryptographic standards selection |
| SOC 2 CC6.7 | Encryption controls |
| ISO 27001 Annex A.10 | Cryptographic controls |
| HIPAA §164.312 | Technical safeguards (encryption) |
| GDPR Article 32 | Security of processing |
| PCI DSS Requirement 3-4 | Cardholder data protection |
1.2 System Scope
| System Category | Encryption Scope | Key Management |
|---|
| Production SaaS Platform | Full encryption requirements | AWS KMS |
| Production Databases | At-rest and in-transit encryption | AWS KMS CMK |
| Staging Environments | Same as production (with customer data) | AWS KMS |
| Development Environments | TLS for communication | Standard TLS |
| Corporate Systems | Disk encryption, TLS | Endpoint + cloud |
| Backup Systems | At-rest encryption | Separate KMS keys |
| DR Systems | Same as production | Cross-region KMS |
1.3 Data Classification and Encryption Requirements
| Classification | At Rest | In Transit | Application Layer | Key Management |
|---|
| Public | Optional | TLS 1.2+ | Not required | Standard |
| Internal | AES-256 recommended | TLS 1.2+ | Not required | AWS KMS |
| Confidential | AES-256 required | TLS 1.2+ required | Recommended for sensitive fields | AWS KMS CMK |
| Restricted | AES-256 + field-level | TLS 1.3 preferred | Required | CMK or customer-managed |
Cryptographic Algorithm Standards
2.1 Symmetric Encryption Algorithms
| Algorithm | Mode | Key Size | Approved Use | Prohibited Use | Sunset |
|---|
| AES-256 | GCM | 256-bit | All encryption at rest, field-level encryption | ECB mode | Active |
| AES-256 | CBC + HMAC-SHA256 | 256-bit | Legacy migration only | New implementations | 2027 |
| AES-128 | GCM | 128-bit | Low-sensitivity transient data only | Database encryption, sensitive data | Active (limited) |
| ChaCha20-Poly1305 | N/A | 256-bit | Mobile SDK, streaming encryption | Server-side database encryption | Active |
| 3DES | Any | Any | Prohibited | All use | Sunset 2023 |
| DES | Any | Any | Prohibited | All use | Sunset 2000 |
| RC4 | N/A | Any | Prohibited | All use | Sunset 2015 |
| Blowfish | Any | Any | Prohibited | All use | Sunset 2010 |
2.2 Asymmetric Encryption Algorithms
| Algorithm | Key Size | Approved Use | Prohibited Use | Sunset |
|---|
| RSA | 4096-bit | Legacy certificate migration, key exchange | New PKI, code signing | 2027 |
| RSA | 2048-bit | Prohibited for new use | All new use | 2025 |
| RSA | < 2048-bit | Prohibited | All use | Sunset |
| ECDSA | P-384 (secp384r1) | Code signing, internal PKI, API signing | N/A | Active |
| ECDSA | P-256 (secp256r1) | TLS certificates, standard use | High-security applications | Active |
| Ed25519 | 256-bit | SSH keys, service authentication, signatures | N/A | Active |
| X25519 | 256-bit | Key exchange (TLS 1.3) | N/A | Active |
2.3 Hashing Algorithms
| Algorithm | Approved Use | Prohibited Use | Notes |
|---|
| SHA-256 | General hashing, HMAC, integrity | Password hashing alone | Standard choice |
| SHA-384 | High-security hashing, code signing | N/A | When SHA-256 insufficient |
| SHA-512 | High-security hashing | N/A | Alternative to SHA-384 |
| SHA-1 | Prohibited for security | All security purposes | Legacy compatibility only |
| MD5 | Prohibited | All security purposes | Checksums only (non-security) |
| BLAKE2b | Content addressing, high-performance | N/A | Approved for specific use cases |
| BLAKE3 | High-performance hashing | N/A | Approved for specific use cases |
2.4 Password Hashing Algorithms
| Algorithm | Parameters | Approved Use | Notes |
|---|
| Argon2id | Memory: 64MB, Iterations: 3, Parallelism: 4 | New password storage | Preferred |
| bcrypt | Cost factor: 12 minimum | Legacy password storage | Migration to Argon2id |
| scrypt | N: 32768, r: 8, p: 1 | Alternative to Argon2id | Approved |
| PBKDF2 | 310,000 iterations (SHA-256) | Legacy systems only | Migrate to Argon2id |
| SHA-1/MD5 | Any | Prohibited | Immediate migration required |
| Plaintext | N/A | Prohibited | Security incident if discovered |
2.5 Key Derivation Functions
| Function | Parameters | Approved Use |
|---|
| HKDF (RFC 5869) | SHA-256 or SHA-384 | Deriving keys from shared secrets |
| Argon2id | As specified above | Password-based key derivation |
| PBKDF2 | 310,000 iterations minimum | Legacy key derivation |
| scrypt | As specified above | Password-based key derivation |
Transport Layer Security
3.1 TLS Version Requirements
| Protocol Version | Status | Use Case | Configuration |
|---|
| TLS 1.3 | Preferred | All new connections, public endpoints | Primary |
| TLS 1.2 | Approved | Backward compatibility | With approved cipher suites only |
| TLS 1.1 | Prohibited | N/A | Blocked at load balancer |
| TLS 1.0 | Prohibited | N/A | Blocked at load balancer |
| SSL 3.0 | Prohibited | N/A | Blocked |
| SSL 2.0 | Prohibited | N/A | Blocked |
3.2 Approved TLS Cipher Suites
TLS 1.3 Cipher Suites (Preferred):
| Cipher Suite | Key Exchange | Encryption | Hash | Status |
|---|
| TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | ECDHE/DHE | AES-256-GCM | SHA-384 | Preferred |
| TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 | ECDHE/DHE | ChaCha20-Poly1305 | SHA-256 | Approved |
| TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | ECDHE/DHE | AES-128-GCM | SHA-256 | Approved |
TLS 1.2 Cipher Suites (Approved for compatibility):
| Cipher Suite | Key Exchange | Encryption | Hash | Status |
|---|
| TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | ECDHE-RSA | AES-256-GCM | SHA-384 | Approved |
| TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | ECDHE-ECDSA | AES-256-GCM | SHA-384 | Approved |
| TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | ECDHE-RSA | AES-128-GCM | SHA-256 | Approved |
| TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | ECDHE-ECDSA | AES-128-GCM | SHA-256 | Approved |
| TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 | ECDHE-RSA | ChaCha20-Poly1305 | SHA-256 | Approved |
Prohibited Cipher Suites:
| Category | Examples | Reason |
|---|
| Non-PFS | RSA key exchange | No forward secrecy |
| CBC mode | CBC ciphers | Vulnerable to padding attacks |
| Export ciphers | EXPORT | Weak encryption |
| NULL ciphers | NULL | No encryption |
| Anonymous | anon | No authentication |
| RC4 | RC4 | Broken algorithm |
| DES/3DES | DES, 3DES | Weak/deprecated |
3.3 Certificate Requirements
| Certificate Type | Key Algorithm | Key Size | Validity | CA Requirement |
|---|
| Public TLS (customer-facing) | ECDSA P-256 or RSA | P-256 or 2048+ RSA | 1 year maximum | Public CA (ACM) |
| Internal mTLS | ECDSA P-384 | P-384 | 1 year | Internal PKI |
| Code signing | ECDSA P-384 | P-384 | 2 years | Internal PKI |
| API signing | Ed25519 | 256-bit | 1 year | Internal PKI |
3.4 HTTP Security Headers
| Header | Value | Purpose |
|---|
| Strict-Transport-Security | max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload | Force HTTPS |
| Content-Security-Policy | script-src 'self'; ... | Prevent XSS |
| X-Content-Type-Options | nosniff | Prevent MIME sniffing |
| X-Frame-Options | DENY | Prevent clickjacking |
| Referrer-Policy | strict-origin-when-cross-origin | Control referrer |
Encryption at Rest
4.1 Database Encryption
| Database | Encryption Method | Algorithm | Key Management | Verification |
|---|
| Amazon RDS (PostgreSQL) | Storage encryption (TDE) | AES-256 | AWS KMS CMK | AWS Config rule |
| Field-level (sensitive) | Application encryption | AES-256-GCM | Tenant-specific DEKs | Application audit |
| Backups | Backup encryption | AES-256 | Separate backup CMK | Backup policy |
Field-Level Encryption Implementation:
| Data Type | Encryption Required | DEK Scope | Examples |
|---|
| SSN/Tax ID | Required | Per-tenant | Social Security Number |
| Payment tokens | Required | Per-tenant | Stripe tokens |
| PHI fields | Required (BAA customers) | Per-tenant | Medical record numbers |
| API secrets | Required | Per-tenant | Integration credentials |
| PII (configurable) | Customer-configurable | Per-tenant | Email, phone |
4.2 Object Storage Encryption
| Storage Type | Encryption Method | Algorithm | Key | Verification |
|---|
| Amazon S3 | SSE-KMS | AES-256 | Per-bucket CMK | Bucket policy |
| S3 (backups) | SSE-KMS | AES-256 | Dedicated backup CMK | Backup policy |
| S3 (logs) | SSE-KMS | AES-256 | Logging CMK | Log configuration |
S3 Bucket Policy Requirements:
| Requirement | Implementation | Enforcement |
|---|
| Encryption required | Deny unencrypted uploads | Bucket policy |
| TLS required | Deny HTTP requests | Bucket policy |
| Versioning enabled | Object versioning | Bucket configuration |
| Access logging | S3 access logs | Bucket configuration |
4.3 Block Storage Encryption
| Storage Type | Encryption Method | Algorithm | Key | Verification |
|---|
| Amazon EBS | EBS encryption | AES-256 | AWS managed or CMK | Launch template |
| Instance storage | EBS encryption | AES-256 | AWS managed | AMI configuration |
| Root volumes | EBS encryption | AES-256 | AWS managed | Launch template |
4.4 Endpoint Encryption
| Platform | Encryption Method | Algorithm | Key Management | Verification |
|---|
| macOS | FileVault 2 | AES-256-XTS | Device TPM + MDM escrow | MDM compliance |
| Windows | BitLocker | AES-256 | Device TPM + MDM escrow | MDM compliance |
| Linux | LUKS | AES-256-XTS | Device passphrase | Device policy |
| Mobile (iOS) | iOS encryption | AES-256 | Secure Enclave | MDM compliance |
| Mobile (Android) | File-based encryption | AES-256 | Device key | MDM compliance |
Key Management
5.1 Key Management Architecture
Acme Cloud uses AWS Key Management Service (KMS) as the primary key management platform with the following hierarchy:
| Key Level | Description | Storage | Rotation |
|---|
| Root keys | AWS KMS CMKs | AWS HSM (FIPS 140-2 Level 3) | Annual automatic |
| Key Encryption Keys (KEKs) | CMKs for encrypting DEKs | AWS KMS | Annual automatic |
| Data Encryption Keys (DEKs) | Keys encrypting data directly | Encrypted by KEK | Per-operation or periodic |
| Session keys | TLS session keys | Memory only | Per-session |
5.2 Key Lifecycle Management
| Phase | Requirements | Implementation | Verification |
|---|
| Generation | Cryptographically secure random | AWS KMS GenerateDataKey | KMS API audit |
| Distribution | Never transmit plaintext | Envelope encryption | Architecture review |
| Storage | Hardware-protected, access-controlled | AWS KMS, HSM-backed | KMS configuration |
| Use | Least privilege, audit logging | IAM policies, CloudTrail | Access reviews |
| Rotation | Scheduled, documented | Automatic KMS rotation | Rotation logs |
| Archival | Encrypted, access-controlled | N/A (KMS handles) | N/A |
| Destruction | Cryptographic erasure, 7-30 day wait | KMS ScheduleKeyDeletion | Deletion logs |
5.3 Key Rotation Schedule
| Key Type | Rotation Period | Rotation Method | Verification |
|---|
| KMS CMKs | 365 days | Automatic KMS rotation | CloudTrail logs |
| Database DEKs | Per-write (envelope) | Automatic | Application logs |
| TLS certificates | 60 days before expiry | ACM auto-renewal | Certificate monitoring |
| mTLS certificates | 30 days before expiry | PKI auto-renewal | PKI monitoring |
| SSH keys | 365 days | Manual rotation | Key inventory audit |
| API keys | 90 days | Automated rotation | Secrets Manager logs |
| Service account credentials | 90 days | Automated rotation | Secrets Manager logs |
5.4 Key Access Controls
| Role | KMS Permissions | Use Case |
|---|
| KMS Administrator | kms:Create*, kms:Put*, kms:Delete*, kms:Enable*, kms:Disable* | Key management |
| Application | kms:Encrypt, kms:Decrypt, kms:GenerateDataKey | Data encryption |
| Auditor | kms:Describe*, kms:List*, kms:Get* | Compliance review |
| Security | kms:* (scoped to security keys) | Security operations |
5.5 Customer-Managed Keys (Enterprise)
Enterprise customers may bring their own keys (BYOK):
| CMK Feature | Implementation | Customer Responsibility |
|---|
| Key provision | Customer creates CMK, grants Acme Cloud access | Key creation, IAM policy |
| Cross-account access | IAM role assumption | Grant Acme Cloud IAM role |
| Key rotation | Customer-managed | Rotation configuration |
| Key revocation | Remove IAM grant | Immediate data access loss |
| Audit | CloudTrail in customer account | Log monitoring |
CMK Provisioning Process:
| Step | Action | Owner |
|---|
| 1 | Customer creates KMS CMK | Customer |
| 2 | Customer configures key policy | Customer |
| 3 | Customer grants Acme Cloud IAM role access | Customer |
| 4 | Acme Cloud validates key access | Acme Cloud |
| 5 | Acme Cloud configures tenant to use CMK | Acme Cloud |
| 6 | Data encrypted with customer CMK | Acme Cloud |
Certificate Management
6.1 Certificate Inventory
| Certificate Type | Issuer | Validity | Renewal Automation |
|---|
| Public TLS (*.acmecloud.com) | AWS ACM | 13 months | Automatic (60 days) |
| Internal mTLS | Acme Cloud Internal CA | 1 year | Automatic (30 days) |
| Code signing | Acme Cloud Internal CA | 2 years | Manual (60 days) |
| SAML signing | Acme Cloud Internal CA | 3 years | Manual (90 days) |
6.2 Certificate Lifecycle
| Phase | Process | Automation | Monitoring |
|---|
| Issuance | CSR generation, CA signing | Terraform + ACM/PKI | Inventory update |
| Deployment | Certificate installation | Terraform + config management | Deployment verification |
| Monitoring | Expiration tracking | Certificate monitoring | 60/30/14/7-day alerts |
| Renewal | New certificate issuance | Automatic for ACM | Renewal verification |
| Revocation | CRL/OCSP update | Manual process | Revocation verification |
| Expiration | Certificate removal | Prevented by monitoring | Expiration alerts |
6.3 Certificate Revocation
| Revocation Trigger | Response Time | Process |
|---|
| Key compromise | Immediate | Emergency rotation, incident response |
| Employee departure | 24 hours | Certificate revocation, CRL update |
| Service decommission | Planned | Certificate revocation |
| Algorithm deprecation | Per timeline | Planned migration |
Cryptographic Incident Response
7.1 Cryptographic Incidents
| Incident Type | Severity | Response | Notification |
|---|
| Key compromise | SEV1 | Immediate rotation, forensics | Customer within 24 hours |
| Algorithm vulnerability | Varies | Assess impact, plan migration | Advisory if affected |
| Certificate compromise | SEV1 | Immediate revocation | Customer within 24 hours |
| Weak encryption discovered | SEV2 | Remediation plan | Internal escalation |
| Encryption failure | SEV2 | Investigation, remediation | Customer if data affected |
7.2 Key Compromise Response (IR-CRYPTO-001)
Step 1: Detection and Confirmation (0-30 minutes)
1.1. Alert received or compromise reported
1.2. Initial assessment and severity classification
1.3. Incident commander assigned
Step 2: Containment (0-2 hours)
2.1. Isolate affected systems if necessary
2.2. Rotate compromised keys immediately
2.3. Revoke associated certificates
2.4. Update access controls
Step 3: Assessment (2-24 hours)
3.1. Determine scope of compromise
3.2. Identify affected data
3.3. Preserve forensic evidence
3.4. Assess regulatory notification requirements
Step 4: Remediation (24-72 hours)
4.1. Complete key rotation across all affected systems
4.2. Re-encrypt affected data if necessary
4.3. Deploy additional controls
4.4. Verify remediation effectiveness
Step 5: Recovery and Reporting (72 hours - 5 days)
5.1. Confirm normal operations
5.2. Complete incident report
5.3. Conduct post-incident review
5.4. Implement lessons learned
Post-Quantum Cryptography Readiness
8.1 PQC Transition Strategy
Acme Cloud is preparing for the transition to post-quantum cryptography:
| Phase | Timeline | Activities |
|---|
| Assessment | 2025-2026 | Cryptographic inventory, dependency mapping |
| Planning | 2026-2027 | Migration planning, hybrid protocol testing |
| Pilot | 2027-2028 | Hybrid PQC deployment for internal services |
| Migration | 2028-2030 | Production PQC deployment |
8.2 PQC Algorithm Roadmap
| Algorithm | NIST Status | Acme Cloud Plan | Target Use Case |
|---|
| ML-KEM (Kyber) | Standardized (FIPS 203) | Pilot 2027 | Key encapsulation |
| ML-DSA (Dilithium) | Standardized (FIPS 204) | Pilot 2027 | Digital signatures |
| SLH-DSA (SPHINCS+) | Standardized (FIPS 205) | Evaluation | Stateless signatures |
| Hybrid TLS | In development | Pilot 2027 | Transport security |
8.3 Cryptographic Agility Preparation
| Preparation Area | Current State | Target State |
|---|
| Algorithm abstraction | Partial | Full abstraction layer |
| Key length flexibility | Fixed in some systems | Configurable |
| Protocol versioning | TLS version negotiation | Algorithm negotiation |
| Testing capability | Manual | Automated algorithm testing |
Compliance Monitoring
9.1 Encryption Compliance Checks
| Check | Scope | Frequency | Tool |
|---|
| TLS configuration | All endpoints | Continuous | SSL Labs, Datadog |
| Certificate expiration | All certificates | Daily | Certificate monitoring |
| S3 encryption | All buckets | Continuous | AWS Config |
| EBS encryption | All volumes | Continuous | AWS Config |
| RDS encryption | All databases | Continuous | AWS Config |
| Secrets rotation | All secrets | Weekly | Secrets Manager audit |
9.2 Compliance Dashboards
| Dashboard | Content | Audience | Update Frequency |
|---|
| Encryption Compliance | Overall encryption status | Security Leadership | Daily |
| Certificate Status | Certificate inventory, expiration | Security Operations | Real-time |
| Key Rotation | Rotation compliance | Security Operations | Weekly |
| Vulnerability Status | Cryptographic vulnerabilities | Security Engineering | Daily |
9.3 Audit Evidence
| Evidence Type | Source | Retention | Audit Use |
|---|
| KMS audit logs | CloudTrail | 7 years | SOC 2, ISO 27001 |
| TLS configuration | SSL Labs scans | 1 year | Penetration testing |
| Certificate inventory | PKI system | Current + 1 year | Compliance review |
| Encryption settings | AWS Config | 7 years | SOC 2, ISO 27001 |
| Rotation records | Secrets Manager | 7 years | SOC 2, ISO 27001 |
Developer Guidelines
10.1 Approved Cryptographic Libraries
| Language | Library | Use Case | Version |
|---|
| Node.js | crypto (built-in) | General cryptography | Current LTS |
| Node.js | @aws-sdk/client-kms | KMS operations | Latest |
| Node.js | argon2 | Password hashing | 0.31+ |
| Python | cryptography | General cryptography | 41.0+ |
| Python | boto3 | KMS operations | Latest |
| Go | crypto (standard library) | General cryptography | Current |
| Go | aws-sdk-go-v2 | KMS operations | Latest |
10.2 Prohibited Practices
| Practice | Reason | Correct Approach |
|---|
| Hardcoded secrets | Exposure risk | Use Secrets Manager |
| Custom crypto algorithms | Likely insecure | Use approved libraries |
| ECB mode | Pattern leakage | Use GCM or CBC+HMAC |
| MD5/SHA-1 for security | Collision vulnerabilities | Use SHA-256+ |
| Plaintext password storage | Direct exposure | Use Argon2id |
| Static IVs/nonces | Breaks encryption | Generate random per operation |
| Key in source code | Version control exposure | Use KMS |
| Self-signed certs (production) | Trust issues | Use CA-issued |
10.3 Code Review Checklist
| Review Item | Pass Criteria |
|---|
| Secrets handling | No hardcoded secrets, proper injection |
| Algorithm selection | Approved algorithms only |
| Key management | KMS or approved vault |
| Random generation | Cryptographically secure source |
| TLS configuration | Approved cipher suites |
| Password handling | Approved hashing algorithm |
| Certificate validation | Proper chain verification |
Framework Mapping Appendix
SOC 2 Trust Services Criteria Mapping
| TSC | Control | Acme Cloud Implementation | Evidence |
|---|
| CC6.1 | Encryption keys protected | KMS with IAM controls | KMS policies |
| CC6.7 | Data encrypted in transit | TLS 1.2+, mTLS | TLS configuration |
| CC6.7 | Data encrypted at rest | AES-256, KMS | Encryption settings |
| CC6.7 | Encryption key management | KMS lifecycle, rotation | Rotation logs |
ISO 27001 Annex A Mapping
| Control | Acme Cloud Implementation | Evidence |
|---|
| A.10.1.1 | Cryptographic controls policy | This document |
| A.10.1.2 | Key management | KMS, rotation, destruction |
| A.13.2.1 | Network security controls | TLS requirements |
| A.14.1.2 | Application security | Secure coding guidelines |
| A.14.1.3 | System protection | Encryption requirements |
NIST SP 800-53 Mapping
| Control | Acme Cloud Implementation | Evidence |
|---|
| SC-8 | Transmission confidentiality | TLS 1.2+ |
| SC-12 | Key management | KMS, key lifecycle |
| SC-13 | Cryptographic protection | Approved algorithms |
| SC-17 | PKI certificates | Certificate management |
| SC-28 | Protection at rest | AES-256 encryption |
HIPAA Technical Safeguards Mapping
| HIPAA Section | Requirement | Acme Cloud Implementation | Evidence |
|---|
| §164.312(a)(2)(iv) | Encryption (addressable) | AES-256 at rest | Encryption settings |
| §164.312(e)(1) | Transmission security | TLS 1.2+ | TLS configuration |
| §164.312(e)(2)(ii) | Encryption (transmission) | TLS for PHI | Network architecture |
Related Trust Center documents
security overview, access control, backup recovery, data retention, hipaa statement, penetration testing
Document revision history
| Version | Date | Author | Summary of changes |
|---|
| 1.0 | 2024-06-01 | Legal & Compliance | Initial Trust Center publication |
| 2.0 | 2025-03-15 | GRC Program | SOC 2 Type II alignment refresh; expanded subprocessors |
| 2.5 | 2025-09-01 | Security Engineering | Encryption standards update; ISO 27001 mapping |
| 3.0 | 2026-01-15 | Trust Center Program | Full procurement-grade expansion; 34-document set |
Contact
Acme Cloud, Inc.
1200 Market Street, Suite 400
San Francisco, CA 94103, USA